

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Case No. 17 C 6260
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
CITY OF CHICAGO,	)	Chicago, Illinois
	)	November 18, 2025
Defendant.	)	1:03 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - PUBLIC HEARING  
BEFORE THE HONORABLE REBECCA R. PALLMEYER

APPEARANCES:

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BY: MR. WALLACE HILKE

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ALSO PRESENT: LARRY SNELLING, CPD  
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THOMAS STOYIAS, CPD  
JACOB ALDERDEN, CPD  
RHONDA ANDERSON, CPD  
PATRICK KINNEY, CPD  
PAUL EVANS, CPD

1 APPEARANCES (Cont'd):

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PROCEEDINGS REPORTED BY STENOTYPE  
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1 (Proceedings commenced via video):

2 THE COURT: I want to thank all of you for joining me  
3 this afternoon for our monthly hearing. We have a number of  
4 things on the agenda. We have, I think, a full schedule this  
5 afternoon.

6 Let me just remind you, as I always do, that the  
7 hearing this afternoon is not to be recorded or broadcast by  
8 any of you. If you do need a record, we have the court  
9 reporter making a record, and it's the record made by the court  
10 reporter that's the official record of this proceeding.

11 I'll ask for brief opening remarks from the  
12 Independent Monitoring Team about the report that I believe  
13 everyone has gotten and many of us have had a chance to review  
14 and then on -- as well on Crisis Intervention and Use of Force,  
15 so we'll begin there with the Independent Monitoring Team.

16 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

17 Good afternoon to everyone joining us for our monthly  
18 status hearing today. Again, my name is Maggie Hickey. I am  
19 the independent monitor for the Consent Decree.

20 During today's public hearing, which is a bit longer  
21 than usual, we will hear from the parties to the Consent  
22 Decree, the City of Chicago, and the State of Illinois about  
23 accomplishments and remaining challenges focused on CPD's Use  
24 of Force and Crisis Intervention strategies.

25 Before we hear from the parties, I'd like to share a

1 few updates about the most recent status under the Consent  
2 Decree from our latest report, Independent Monitoring  
3 Report 12, IMR-12, which covers compliance efforts from  
4 January 1st through June 30th of 2025 and was filed with the  
5 Court on October 15th just a few weeks ago.

6 As a reminder, the IMT determines compliance levels at  
7 three levels regarding the CPD and City's efforts towards  
8 compliance. They are preliminary, secondary, and full  
9 compliance.

10 Through June of 2025, the City has achieved at least  
11 preliminary compliance with 94 percent of the original  
12 monitorable paragraphs, approximately 518 paragraphs, and at  
13 least secondary compliance with about 66 percent of the  
14 paragraphs, or 365 paragraphs, and full compliance with about  
15 23 percent, approximately 128 paragraphs.

16 In addition to paragraphs where the City and the CPD  
17 maintain compliance, the City gained additional levels of  
18 compliance with about 82 of these paragraphs, about 15 percent  
19 of the original monitorable -- it's switching to making that  
20 monitorable word that is tricky for me, sorry about that --  
21 that moved in towards full compliance. That was about  
22 36 paragraphs.

23 IMR-12, along with all of our reports, are available  
24 on our website, [cpdmonitoringteam.com](http://cpdmonitoringteam.com).

25 Given the subjects of today's hearings, I wanted to

1 focus on developments related to Crisis Intervention and the  
2 Use of Force sections. Our Associate Monitor for the Use of  
3 Force section, Commissioner Paul Evans, will provide details  
4 for the Use of Force section, but I would first like to briefly  
5 review some of the accomplishments and challenges related to  
6 the Crisis Intervention section.

7           The CIT section of the Consent Decree requires  
8 coordinated change among many city entities including the CPD,  
9 the Office of Emergency Management & Communications, and the  
10 Chicago Council on Mental Health and Equity.

11           Over the last six and a half years, the City and CPD  
12 have made significant progress in developing and refining  
13 organizational processes; updating crucial policies; developing  
14 and delivering impactful training; and collecting, analyzing,  
15 and using data about the CPD's efforts to intervene when  
16 responding to calls for service involving people in crisis.

17           The CPD has also improved its processes and  
18 requirements to determine which officers may serve as certified  
19 Crisis Intervention Team officers. In fact, the CPD recently  
20 completed the process of vetting its certified CIT officers,  
21 approximately 2,000 serving in patrol, ensuring these officers  
22 meet the requirements outlined in the Consent Decree-compliant  
23 policy to serve in these specialized roles for Chicago.

24           While we recognize and appreciate the progress that  
25 has been made, we note that there are some challenges that

1 remain.

2           The Consent Decree requires that the number of  
3 certified CIT officers on each watch in every district will be  
4 driven by the demand for Crisis Intervention services for that  
5 particular watch and district and requires the CPD to dispatch  
6 certified CIT officers to timely respond to the majority of  
7 calls for service identified as involving individuals in  
8 crisis. Achieving these requirements is crucial to meeting  
9 Chicago's needs and continues to be a work in progress for the  
10 City and the CPD.

11           We note that while 85 percent of the paragraphs in  
12 Crisis Intervention section have preliminary compliance, just  
13 5 percent have achieved full compliance, and 15 percent have  
14 yet to achieve any level of compliance.

15           Unfortunately, there has been understaffing in CPD's  
16 Crisis Intervention's Unit, which inevitably played a role in  
17 the CPD's ability to reach full and effective compliance with  
18 these requirements. Likewise, the City and CPD have fallen  
19 behind in developing the required Crisis Intervention Plan and  
20 the Crisis Intervention Officer Implementation Plan which needs  
21 to still be produced to the IMT and has not been reproduced  
22 since 2020.

23           We have been encouraged, however, that the City and  
24 the CPD's efforts in 2025 are really going to catch up on these  
25 requirements which are critical for CPD's Crisis Intervention

1 efforts to become self-sustaining. We hope the Court and the  
2 public will hear more about these efforts during today's  
3 hearings.

4 Now I'd like to introduce Associate Monitor for Use of  
5 Force, Commissioner Paul Evans, who will provide a few comments  
6 on CPD's progress towards compliance with the requirements in  
7 that section of the Consent Decree.

8 Commissioner Evans?

9 MR. EVANS: Thanks, Maggie.

10 Good afternoon, Your Honor, and everyone.

11 Like the Crisis Intervention section, the Use of Force  
12 section of the Consent Decree has seen some critical  
13 achievements since the inception of this reform process. While  
14 some of these changes over the past six and a half years have  
15 been high profile, such as the implementation of the CPD's foot  
16 pursuit policy, others have been less visible but no less  
17 important. This includes the early and ongoing efforts to  
18 review and revise the CPD's Use of Force policy suite which  
19 include policies related to firearm pointing incidents and  
20 community engagement in policy and training development.

21 Likewise, the CPD has dedicated significant efforts to  
22 develop and continuously improve Use of Force training such as  
23 the Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue Training, which trains  
24 officers to provide immediate medical aid at the scene of  
25 injuries.

1           Many of these background efforts have been geared  
2 toward improving the CPD's ability to collect and analyze Use  
3 of Force data to not only better inform CPD's policies,  
4 training, and practices, but transparency.

5           It is also important to remember where things started  
6 and where things are now. When the Consent Decree began  
7 six and a half years ago, all CPD officers were not wearing  
8 body-worn cameras consistently, nor did the CPD have a best  
9 practices policy in place. Since then, the CPD's use of  
10 body-worn cameras has improved dramatically, but body-worn  
11 camera compliance remains a significant issue due to CPD  
12 officers too frequently, for example, activating their  
13 body-worn cameras later than required under the policy.

14           While we recognize and appreciate the progress that  
15 has been made, we must also note the remaining challenges,  
16 including implementing a comprehensive set of Consent Decree  
17 compliant processes for transparently and reliably reviewing,  
18 analyzing, and learning from its Use of Force data and making  
19 appropriate changes to best protect the rights and safety of  
20 Chicago's communities and officers.

21           Many of the challenges to achieving a self-sustained  
22 model have been recently raised with the Court such as the fact  
23 that the CPD's Tactical Review and Evaluation Division, also  
24 known as TRED, still struggles with backlog of use of force  
25 incidents to review. This is despite the fact that the CPD has



1 taken various efforts to reduce this backlog, such as the  
2 firearm pointing pilot program, which moved the review of such  
3 incidents involving firearm pointing to the district level.

4 After years of dedicated efforts to comply with the  
5 Use of Force section, by the end of June 2025, the CPD has  
6 achieved preliminary compliance with 97 percent of the  
7 requirements in the Use of Force section, and full compliance  
8 was obtained for 41 percent of the requirements.

9 We must also recognize that the use of force is  
10 trending upwards, and we continue to carefully monitor  
11 compliance with the Consent Decree which requires the CPD be  
12 able to demonstrate that the force is not only constitutional,  
13 but objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under  
14 the totality of the circumstances.

15 We look forward to hearing from the City and the  
16 department today on their perspective of the CPD's use of force  
17 since the start of the Consent Decree and their ongoing efforts  
18 to serve Chicago.

19 Thank you.

20 MS. HICKEY: Thank you very much, Paul, and thank Your  
21 Honor for the opportunity for us to provide these updates, and  
22 we look forward to today's presentations.

23 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Evans. That was  
24 helpful, and I think we're ready, then, to hear next from  
25 Mr. Slagel. We're going to be hearing from the City and hear a

1 brief presentation on the community engagement opportunities.

2 MR. SLAGEL: Your Honor, I'm going to turn that over  
3 to Executive Director Allyson Clark Henson, who will do a  
4 presentation on public engagement opportunities for the  
5 community.

6 THE COURT: Thank you.

7 MS. HENSON: Thank you. Good afternoon.

8 I just wanted to make sure everyone was aware, because  
9 we do have four policies that as of November 18th are open for  
10 public comment. We encourage everyone to please take that  
11 QR code to the right, scan that, and provide your comments on  
12 all of these policies: D25-06, Training Division Instructor  
13 Evaluations - Pilot; E04-05, the Returning Service Officer  
14 Program; G03-02-04, Taser Use Incidents; and U04-02-02, Control  
15 Devices and Instruments.

16 Next slide, please.

17 In addition, we have some updates on the Workforce  
18 Allocation Study which are also available on our website. We  
19 hosted on October 23rd our webinar which was recorded and is  
20 available to view on that website as well as the presentation  
21 doc that was walked through. It is also available on that  
22 site. And the Matrix has finalized two important documents,  
23 the first being the organizational profile, which is a  
24 comprehensive outline of CPD's current structure and staffing  
25 classifications. The second is an interim framework report,

1 which is the initial analytical framework which establishes the  
2 methodology for their future workload and resource modeling  
3 analysis. These are both rather lengthy documents, so we also  
4 provide an executive summary which synthesizes community  
5 engagement outcomes, key findings, and next steps in  
6 collaboration with Matrix and the steering committee. Again,  
7 this is available on the website. I believe -- yep, there we  
8 are. We have the QR code. You can scan that, and that will  
9 take you to the site that has all of that documentation and the  
10 webinar available.

11 Thank you.

12 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Henson.

13 Are there some questions about that?

14 Great. We're moving on, then?

15 MR. SLAGEL: Yes, Your Honor. Now we're going to have  
16 three presentations. These will be encompassing the changes  
17 that the department has undertaken in the last decade on Use of  
18 Force policies, Use of Force trainings, and operations with  
19 regard to officer-involved shootings.

20 We picked the last decade as it was about a decade ago  
21 that the video from the Laquan McDonald shooting was released,  
22 and shortly thereafter, the DOJ investigation began, which  
23 ultimately ended in this Consent Decree.

24 We're going to go through the three presentations  
25 consecutively. The presenters will be Associate [sic] Director

1 Tom Stoyias, then it'll be Captain Jake Alderden, and then  
2 Commander Pat Kinney. It'll be approximately 30 minutes in  
3 length. If you would like to interrupt, please let us know.  
4 Otherwise, we will take questions at the end.

5 THE COURT: I'm ready to go.

6 MR. SLAGEL: Okay. I'll turn that over to Assistant  
7 Director Stoyias.

8 MR. STOYIAS: Hi. Thank you very much, Allan.  
9 Appreciate it.

10 Good afternoon, Your Honor. Thank you for the  
11 opportunity to do this.

12 I am going to go through some slides here, a timeline  
13 of kind of where we started and where we're at, and then I'm  
14 going to go through some slides that focus on some subject  
15 topics that are important through our policy development and  
16 kind of where we were to kind of where we are. So then through  
17 those, you'll see kind of the language revisions and the  
18 updates that we have made throughout the years.

19 So to start out, 2016 here, you see we established the  
20 Force Mitigation principles and Sanctity of Life, so we were  
21 working -- I was part of the unit at that time. We were  
22 working through those Force Mitigation principles and  
23 discussing the Sanctity of Life language. At that time, we  
24 also expanded the Taser availability as an alternate force  
25 option for our members.

1           From 2016 to 2017, ma'am, we solicited subject matter  
2 expert info from community feedback. We also posted some of  
3 that community feedback for our policies to make sure that we  
4 were gathering info from the community on our policies at that  
5 time.

6           In April 2017, we created a Force Review Unit, which  
7 now is known as TRED, but at that time, it was the Force Review  
8 Unit, which they were created to look at department level  
9 reviews.

10           October of 2017, we implemented numerous revisions to  
11 the CPD Use of Force policies and reporting, and you'll notice  
12 as we skip through the next set of slides kind of the large  
13 language increases as 2017 hits before the current.

14           Through 2019 to 2020, we implemented the Consent  
15 Decree requirements on those policies including the Force  
16 Review Board.

17           From 2020 to 2021, at that point, we established a Use  
18 of Force Community Working Group.

19           In 2021, most of our Use of Force policies were  
20 community-centric, and we made a bunch of changes around those  
21 policies regarding de-escalation and accountability.

22           In 2023, our policy revision focused -- they continued  
23 to focus on the working group efforts and codifying the SAFE-T  
24 Act laws that were upon us.

25           2025 and currently, we're working through community

1 engagement and continuing to review our policies as we are in a  
2 two-year review process right now for the use of force.

3 Next slide, please.

4 So, again, as I said, there's some topics here, and  
5 I'm kind of going to go through bullet by bullet because  
6 they're important to see the lineage of how we've gone from  
7 where we were to where we are.

8 Force Mitigation and de-escalation, and pre-2017, we  
9 basically utilized the force model which guided escalation and  
10 de-escalation, and it was really focused on members applying  
11 force reasonable and necessary to overcome the subject's  
12 resistance and get control.

13 In 2017, we established those Force Mitigation  
14 principles that I talked about where we use de-escalation when  
15 it's safe and feasible. We're continually wanting our officers  
16 to assess and modify force, and then those principles of force  
17 mitigation were put into the policy at that point in time,  
18 being able to continue to communicate, you know, positioning,  
19 tactically positioning yourself to gain a better advantage, and  
20 then using time as a tactic.

21 Currently at 2025, we expand those Force Mitigation  
22 principles to a more affirmative requirement, so you'll see we  
23 require the use of de-escalation techniques to prevent or  
24 reduce the need of force, okay? But then as well as you see  
25 that bullet point below, unless doing so, you know, would place

1 that person or a department member in immediate harm, it would  
2 be clearly ineffective. We continually want our officers to  
3 assess the situation and consider individualized factors and  
4 modify the use of force if circumstances changes.

5 Next slide, please.

6 Next topic necessary for the use of force, so  
7 pre-2017, the amount of force reasonable and necessary was  
8 always based on the totality of the circumstances to perform an  
9 arrest or, you know, perform a task, make the arrest, overcome  
10 resistance, control a subject, things of that nature.

11 In 2017, we revised it to that which said members will  
12 only use the amount of force required under circumstances to  
13 serve a lawful purpose.

14 But in 2025 in our current, you'll see that we put in  
15 there the department members will use the minimum amount of  
16 force to provide for the safety of any person or department  
17 member to stop the attack, make the arrest, or bring a person  
18 safely under control.

19 So, again, you see kind of the lineage of where we  
20 were in 2017 and kind of how we've gone to make sure that we've  
21 put more parameters around what that means and the need to use  
22 the minimum amount of use of force as needed.

23 Next slide, please.

24 The next topic talks about specific use of force  
25 prohibitions, so pre-2017, the Use of Force model guided pretty

1 much the identification of excessive force. The Use of Force  
2 model pre-2017 kind of guided a lot of things that we did as  
3 far as what we could do and how we could do it. Revised,  
4 though, in 2017 to put some specific prohibitions around that.  
5 So the use of excessive, unwarranted force or unprofessional  
6 conduct, using force based on bias or any protected  
7 characteristic, we're not allowing force used as punishment or  
8 retaliation used in response to a person's lawful exercise of  
9 First Amendment rights. And then as you see at the last point  
10 there, deadly force only as a last resort, and we included  
11 choke holds.

12 Now, to go further into that into our current, we  
13 establish more prohibitions, additional ones, right, so not  
14 exhibiting a condescending attitude or derogatory language  
15 towards any person at any time. You know, prohibited from  
16 using deadly force against a person who's a threat to  
17 themselves.

18 To expand on the choke hold here, deadly force as a  
19 last resort -- as a last resort, but we expanded that to the  
20 carotid artery restraint and other restraints where you're, you  
21 know, placing above the shoulders with the risk of causing  
22 positional asphyxia.

23 And then imminent threat talking about from  
24 appearances must be consistently confronted and addressed.

25 Next slide, please.



1           So specific firearm guidelines, another topic.  
2 Pre-2017, again, that model guided the identification of the  
3 weapon and what we -- and how to use that and provided some  
4 prohibitions on warning shots, shots at subjects only a threat  
5 to themselves. We couldn't fire into crowds, at buildings, or  
6 at moving vehicles.

7           In 2017, we established those additional guidelines  
8 that deadly force is a last resort that's permissible only when  
9 necessary to protect against imminent threat to life or to  
10 prevent great bodily harm.

11           Specific definition. At this point, we got into a  
12 specific definition of imminent threat to include -- you know,  
13 we wanted to make sure that that definition included the  
14 actions, the means, and the opportunity. So the individual had  
15 the action, the means to do something, and the opportunity. We  
16 wanted to make sure that that definition was provided inside  
17 that policy in the 2017 version.

18           Prohibited firing solely in defense or protection of  
19 property, and that whenever possible, making sure that we  
20 identify ourselves prior to using deadly force.

21           In 2025, we established a further guideline, not many,  
22 but we established two more guidelines: Firing at a fleeing  
23 person unless necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm  
24 from imminent threat posed to the person or another member, and  
25 then we also added in our current policies a firearm pointing

1 policy which talked about pointing a firearm, you know, when  
2 it's objectively reasonable to do so under the circumstances at  
3 that member's face at the time, and also to stop pointing  
4 immediately when that member recognizes that it's no longer  
5 objectively reasonable to do so.

6 Next slide, please.

7 We also added some specific Taser and OC prohibitions.  
8 Again, in 2017, we followed the model which guided the  
9 identification of weapon use. In 2017, we had specific  
10 prohibitions to Tasers, so you could not use multiple Tasers on  
11 one person. The device itself, the mechanism had a drive-stun  
12 capability which you could only use on an assailant. Against a  
13 vulnerable person, you'd only be able to use it on an assailant  
14 as well. For OC spray, against vulnerable people only when  
15 that individual was an assailant and as well in closed spaces  
16 due to the reaction of what that OC does. In enclosed spaces  
17 only when it's against an assailant.

18 So in our current policy, we've added a few more  
19 additional prohibitions there, and I think those are important,  
20 especially when you talk about being able to utilize tools.  
21 Our Taser use strongly discouraged in schools on students,  
22 persons who are handcuffed or restrained, fleeing persons,  
23 being able to use a Taser for pain compliance, persons with  
24 weapons. And in the OC spray, persons who are handcuffed or  
25 restrained, persons among a group, and then during a

1 First Amendment assembly only if there is a threat of attack  
2 against people or property.

3 Next slide talks about our duty to intervene and  
4 medical aid. So pre-2017, our intervention at that point was  
5 take appropriate action if a member knows that someone else is  
6 involved in using excessive force. And then the medical aid at  
7 that time, you know, request appropriate medical aid, and you  
8 may provide it, consistent with your training.

9 In 2017, we strengthened that intervention language a  
10 little bit more. We're obligated to ensure that compliance by  
11 themselves and others, will act to intervene on behalf of the  
12 subject's behalf, and a written report for the misconduct, so  
13 we added those specific requirements back in 2017.

14 The medical aid stayed the same, but in 2025, again,  
15 some additional requirements, so some strengthening of the  
16 language for intervention. We talked about written report  
17 required for all those interventions and no discipline or  
18 retaliation for intervening or reporting any excessive force.  
19 At this point, the medical aid language changed due to the  
20 SAFE-T Act at that point in time where instead of "may," now we  
21 must provide medical aid as soon as reasonably practicable,  
22 consistent with department training, to injured persons until  
23 medical persons arrive.

24 Next slide, please.

25 Reporting and reviews. So pre-2017, Your Honor,

1 members and detention aids in the performance of their duties  
2 would complete a TRR as specified. We revised in 2017, the TRR  
3 took a whole new look. We lengthened out the TRR process in  
4 the form. We provided for more check boxes, for more  
5 information, for more ways to accurately collect what we were  
6 trying to capture in that incident. We also included a TRRI  
7 investigation form, and those three bullets are really  
8 important, you know, requiring a narrative for nonforce deadly  
9 incidents. We wanted our members to be truthful, completely  
10 describing those circumstances, and we also wanted them to  
11 articulate the specific facts to explain decisions to use  
12 force. At that point, we established a Force Review Unit to  
13 function as an after action review capacity like I explained  
14 earlier in that timeline chart.

15           Currently, the TRED, formerly the Force Review Unit,  
16 the Tactical Review and Evaluation conducts all our  
17 department-level reviews. They conduct those reviews on all  
18 reportable uses of force, foot pursuits, and firearm pointings.  
19 TRRs are used to evaluate the use of force including assessing  
20 the type and frequency and any trends that we're seeing with  
21 those types of force.

22           The Incident Debriefing Report, the IDR, which was  
23 created, I think, in 2023 to record incidence reviews by TRED  
24 and other required actions, and currently, we have the Force  
25 Review Board who reviews all Level 3 reportable uses of force,

1 deadly force, force by command staff, and anything at the  
2 superintendent discretion.

3 Now we get into a little transparency. So those were  
4 all the things that we did, Your Honor, before 2017 up until  
5 now, and then, you know, all the changes that we made and all  
6 the things that we went through and language revisions and  
7 community engagement processes which were very helpful in us  
8 developing all those policies and getting us to a good place of  
9 where we are now.

10 The transparency for the department, how do we see --  
11 how are we checking all this? So we have ways that we're  
12 looking into all these things, and here's a couple here on the  
13 screen, and there's a QR code there for anybody that wants to  
14 snap that to take you there.

15 We conduct an Annual Use of Force Report. So every  
16 year, we write an Annual Use of Force Report and we post it to  
17 the [chicagopolice.org](http://chicagopolice.org) website, and it highly involves  
18 everything that revolves around use of force, and it's a very  
19 comprehensive report and it allows you to look for patterns and  
20 trends as well.

21 If you look at the second bullet point there with the  
22 QR code, the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division, the  
23 Tactical Review and Evaluation Division, TRED, does multiple  
24 reports that they send out. They do a mid-year report and a  
25 year-end report as well, and that's on the City of Chicago

1 website as well, [chicagopolice.org](http://chicagopolice.org).

2 Next slide, please.

3 Some other websites, these are really good sites, Your  
4 Honor, especially for individuals or people that want to look  
5 at where we are. Again, you can use these QR codes to kind of  
6 get yourself to these, or you can go on [chicagopolice.org](http://chicagopolice.org) to  
7 find the Use of Force Dashboard. I mean, the dashboard itself  
8 is a really good online tool. It was typically created to  
9 grasp or grab, you know, the type of force, the demographics of  
10 the subject, the officer with the incident location, reason for  
11 initial contact. This was a really good way to provide some  
12 transparency and allowing the public to analyze any of those  
13 trends and data and look at Use of Force policies.

14 That second asterisk there about Use of Force web  
15 page, that, we have in our [chicagopolice.org](http://chicagopolice.org) site, and that,  
16 again, provides a section where you can go and click those blue  
17 tabs, and you'll have a use of force timeline of kind of where  
18 we were to where we are now.

19 The Use of Force directives itself, if you click that  
20 tab, it'll take you there. There's a comment section on the  
21 Use of Force -- sorry. There's a comment section on the Use of  
22 Force policies itself to where you can go and comment on those  
23 policies.

24 Those two reports that I just talked about in the  
25 previous slide, if you click the Use of Force Report tab,

1 you'll be able to get to those as well as the TRED reporting,  
2 and then the dashboard itself.

3 Either way, you can, you know, click those two  
4 QR codes for members of the public or go on [chicagopolice.org](http://chicagopolice.org)  
5 and you're able to track some of this information down.

6 I'm looking forward, so continuing to what we're doing  
7 now, so engagement in Community Conversations. So Community  
8 Conversations, June 24th at Kennedy-King College, so these are  
9 conversations that we've already had, Your Honor, that we  
10 worked with an individual, Marcia Thompson, that helped us work  
11 through some of these Community Conversations. On June 24th at  
12 Kennedy-King, we had a Community Conversation; July 22nd; and  
13 then August 19th was a virtual.

14 There was public education sessions at the Chicago  
15 community colleges done on the 9th, 10th, and the 25th;  
16 community member meetings on CPD's use of force; and then our  
17 CPD policy review and public comment. Again, there's a QR code  
18 there. You know, we posted in July on the 7th all the way to  
19 the 26th. We utilize this site to post all of our policies.  
20 The executive director just showed earlier that some other  
21 policies were going to be posted there. We utilize this site  
22 quite a bit, and we've got some great feedback.

23 You know, at this point, we evaluate all that  
24 feedback, you know, look at current operations. We go through,  
25 you know, subject matter expert information, any national best

1 practices, and any development of those new drafts, we like to  
2 take those into account when, you know, we're looking through  
3 the Use of Force policies.

4 And as you see on that last little bullet point there  
5 that we will be posting for further feedback as we kind of go  
6 through the process that we're going through now as part of the  
7 two-year review.

8 So at this point, I'm going to turn it over, I think,  
9 to Captain Jake Alderden if there's no immediate questions.

10 MR. ALDERDEN: Thank you, Tom.

11 THE COURT: One question I do have, and maybe this  
12 will be addressed by another speaker. I'm curious about --  
13 obviously, there are changes in the policies over time, and I'm  
14 wondering if when the training happens, you know, there's an  
15 explanation about a circumstance in which use of force may have  
16 been acceptable under a previous policy and is no longer or  
17 vice versa. I mean, is the training, you know, specific to  
18 here's a change, here's what might have happened before, here's  
19 what's happening now? Again, I'm not sure. I may be asking  
20 the wrong persons, you know.

21 MR. ALDERDEN: Absolutely, Your Honor. We have an  
22 annual Use of Force training, and during that training, we  
23 address all policy changes very thoroughly to make sure that  
24 our members know, you know, what was and what is.  
25 Additionally, you know, there's directives rolled out monthly,



1 and all of our members are trained on the changes leading up to  
2 the policy, you know, change and when it's put into place. So  
3 those directives are updated by research and development so  
4 members know exactly what's, you know, coming and when it takes  
5 place.

6 THE COURT: Got it. Okay. Thanks.

7 MR. SNELLING: Judge, if I could just follow up on  
8 that just a little bit. The trending was different in 2017. A  
9 lot of it was based on best practices, but it was also based on  
10 our review of some of the things that had gone wrong. As you  
11 see, they started off, you know, talking about the Laquan  
12 McDonald incident, and a lot of it was based on things that,  
13 things that we had seen around the country, and we revised Use  
14 of Force policies. We revised the Use of Force model and our  
15 training based around that to educate our officers on what the  
16 expectations are. That's all a part of the training, and the  
17 training academy does a great job with implementing those  
18 things.

19 THE COURT: Thanks.

20 MR. ALDERDEN: So I'm Captain Jake Alderden from the  
21 Training Division. I'm going to be providing a brief overview  
22 of the recent history and the current status of Use of Force  
23 training here at the academy.

24 Training is pretty much divided into three buckets at  
25 the academy. You have recruit, so the training they get prior

1 to leaving the academy; pre-service, the training they get  
2 prior to their promotion; and in-service. Currently under the  
3 Consent Decree, every member receives 40 hours of in-service  
4 training. 24 hours of that, at a minimum, must be in person.  
5 As you could see from this chart, there's been a significant  
6 amount of Use of Force in-service training since 2016.  
7 Certainly, our members have received more in-service Use of  
8 Force training from 2016 to present than in the entire history  
9 of the Chicago Police Department.

10 Next slide, please.

11 So this is an example of pre-service training. As  
12 Your Honor is aware from attending in early 2024, this is the  
13 pre-service lieutenants officer-involved shooting scenario. So  
14 what we do with the pre-service lieutenants is prior to their  
15 promotion, they're put into the scenario. They have to take  
16 charge of a chaotic officer-involved shooting situation. We  
17 have role players playing the role of distraught family  
18 members, upset community members, members of the media who are  
19 trying to intervene, and the lieutenants must manage all of  
20 this simultaneously while ensuring that they're following  
21 policy.

22 Next slide.

23 So prior to NATO in 2012, there was a significant  
24 investment in training leading up to the NATO event.

25 From post-NATO until through 2020 with the civil

1 unrest, there was very little investment or sustaining of crowd  
2 management training. So as we were building the policy and the  
3 training prior to the DNC, there was a lot of available  
4 information, After Action Reports from across the country and  
5 Chicago from the inspector general's office, the Independent  
6 Monitoring Team, and the city's own After Action Report. We  
7 used all of these to build policy and training, working very  
8 closely with the IMT and the OEG while we built both the policy  
9 and the training.

10           Next, I'm going to go over three classes that all  
11 members attended in 2024. Remember, this was a year that we  
12 were just building leading up to the DNC. So the first class  
13 is the annual Use of Force refresher training, the training I  
14 spoke about. In this training, we would be reinforcing policy  
15 changes from the year prior. Additionally, there's always a  
16 theme. So for this year, due to all the changes in policy  
17 regarding coordinating arrest and response to crowds, it was  
18 very heavy DNC-focused. We talked about First Amendment  
19 considerations, communication, department policy, and, you  
20 know, accurate use of force documentation, ensuring it's both  
21 accurate and timely.

22           Next slide.

23           So the next class was a full day, and all these are  
24 full-day eight-hour classes, was a blended wellness LEMART  
25 class. Large gatherings often involve long hours, high

1 tensions, so we wanted to ensure we provided our officers with  
2 the training to be able to reduce stress, keep the members  
3 calm, control their breathing, effectively giving them the  
4 ability to make good decisions in high stress, unpredictable  
5 situations.

6 LEMART stands for Law Enforcement Medical and Rescue  
7 Training. As you could see by these pictures, these are our  
8 officers. We integrated that into scenarios and refresher  
9 training, and that's them practicing these interventions.

10 Next slide.

11 So the origin of LEMART really goes back to 2011.  
12 Now, Deputy Chief Ralph Cruz and Lieutenant Brian Berkowitz  
13 really were the founders of this and pushed it. It was  
14 originally designed for self-aid. What they found was that if  
15 you give officers the training and the tools that ultimately,  
16 our members are going to treat everybody, not just the police.  
17 This was initially met by resistance as many things are in  
18 large organizations. It takes a while to shift cultures.  
19 Fortunately, they persevered and made this program what it is  
20 today. Of note, in 2019, you'll see that's the year it became  
21 mandatory for all members per the Consent Decree.

22 Next slide.

23 On the left here are the LEMART interventions. On the  
24 right, you could see it's the number of uses per year. You  
25 could see that it's ascending. And of note, these uses, almost

1 entirely, the vast majority of these are officers treating  
2 community members. They're not officers treating other  
3 officers. They're not officers treating community members who  
4 were injured as a result of the officer's use of force. These  
5 are really officers treating community members.

6           If you think about a shots fired call, they dispatch  
7 the police, right? They don't dispatch fire. Even if it's a  
8 person shot call and you're dispatching both fire and police,  
9 just due to the nature of patrol operations, that first, first  
10 responder is very likely to be a CPD member, and giving them  
11 the LEMART training and the tools allows them to intervene in  
12 real time and save lives.

13           Next slide.

14           So and then that additional class was the -- this was  
15 a two- or three-day public order class. Members received two  
16 or three days, depending on their role that they were going to  
17 be in during the DNC. This class really focused on  
18 communication, use of force, team tactics, de-escalation, and  
19 training around the First and Fourth Amendment.

20           Next slide.

21           So prior to these field training exercises, we also  
22 had a one-day supervisor class. All the supervisors came in,  
23 and we trained them up on policy changes as well as potential  
24 crowd management situations. We then brought all the members  
25 we've trained in all these classes and those supervisors

1 together for a series of ten field training exercises, and we  
2 used these. These were refresher exercises and scenario-based  
3 training. This really tied everything together, the entire  
4 training plan, pre-DNC.

5 Next slide.

6 Post-DNC, Superintendent Snelling's committed -- I  
7 talked about how we committed a lot of resources, building up  
8 and training for NATO, and then we did the same for the DNC,  
9 very little in between. Those were known events, not unknown  
10 events. The superintendent wants to make sure that we're  
11 prepared for the unknown. As a result, you could see that  
12 sustainment here. So post-DNC from 2024 to May of 2025, we  
13 trained 940 members in the three-day public order training. We  
14 also on some of those trainings worked with the Bureau of  
15 Detectives and the Bureau of Internal Affairs on a  
16 (indiscernible) refresher.

17 And in 2026, starting in January, we have an entire  
18 one-day crowd management class that every member in the Chicago  
19 Police Department will be attending. This really focuses on  
20 planned gatherings and spontaneous events, just for emphasis on  
21 communication and de-escalation. Additionally, to make sure  
22 that we're always ready for the unknown, now in our training  
23 plan, we have crowd management on an every-other-year cadence,  
24 so we'll be prepared for the unexpected.

25 Next slide.

1           So that annual Use of Force class I talked about in  
2 2024, it was, you know, leading up to the DNC. In 2024, and  
3 what you could see here, so this is the 2025 Use of Force  
4 class, and there's always a theme, so that was DNC.

5           This year is traffic stops. We've trained almost  
6 98 percent of the department in this class. The emphasis here,  
7 in addition to policy communication, de-escalation, is really  
8 on professional treatment, using every stop as an opportunity  
9 to build trust through the highest degree of professionalism by  
10 our members at all times. These classes were designed to  
11 ensure the safest outcome for everyone involved, the community  
12 member and the officer.

13           Next slide.

14           And then finally for 2026, so this is the 2026 Use of  
15 Force class. This year, it'll actually be a 16-hour class, so  
16 two consecutive days. And in addition to the communication  
17 de-escalation component, it's really focused on active threat  
18 response. So the department has not had a department-wide  
19 active threat training. This is long overdue, and I'm very  
20 glad that we fit this in and we're doing this in 2026.

21           So it's -- the officers are trained and given the  
22 skill sets to do three things in an active threat event: Stop  
23 the killing, so they're going to quickly locate, isolate, and  
24 neutralize the threat. They're going to stop the dying. We  
25 talked about the LEMART interventions, so they're going to

1 deliver that immediate care and work with fire to make sure  
2 that everyone that needs medical treatment gets medical  
3 treatment immediately, drastically improving the outcome for  
4 those injured. And then they're going to start the healing  
5 through trauma identification.

6 Next slide.

7 Then finally, Your Honor's aware from attending in  
8 April our Community Training Observation Days, so we hosted two  
9 of these in April, and then we did two in October. What we did  
10 was we took our full-day classes, condensed them to half a day,  
11 and then invited the public to attend the actual training  
12 including the scenarios that officers go through. These were  
13 very successful. We had exceptionally positive feedback, both  
14 in the comments that people made to us during the class, as  
15 well as in the surveys completed. It was a very diverse group  
16 of attendees from all over the city. On October 25th, that  
17 final day, we had 71 people there. It was just really a great  
18 event. I really enjoyed it. I know all the people from  
19 training did as well.

20 There were great conversations and very thoughtful  
21 discussions stemming from community members' questions during  
22 this training. A few of them actually related to me,  
23 especially during the traffic stop scenario, that they had an  
24 idea of exactly what this would be like and how it would play  
25 out, but when they put on a duty belt and walked up to a car



1 and realized there was no scripts, they didn't have any idea  
2 what was going to happen, there was a tremendous amount of  
3 uncertainty, you know, people might be moving around in the  
4 car, they're not listening to what you're telling them to do,  
5 that there was really that, you know, ah-ha moment in that  
6 stress that realized -- they realized that there's a lot of  
7 complexity involved and what our members actually go through  
8 when they're making these stops.

9 Next slide.

10 Then finally, you know, our work is never done here,  
11 obviously. I talked about the 2026 training. We're working on  
12 building the 2027 training, and we do have an annual needs  
13 assessment. We use this. We get community input and input  
14 from officers to inform future years' training, so anyone -- I  
15 just would request that everybody fill out the Training Needs  
16 Assessment because we do certainly use and value that feedback  
17 and participation.

18 So thank you very much for your time, Your Honor. Do  
19 you have any questions for me?

20 THE COURT: No, not right now. Thank you, Captain  
21 Alderden. I appreciate that.

22 MR. ALDERDEN: Thank you very much.

23 Next up will be Commander Kinney.

24 MR. KINNEY: Thanks, Captain.

25 Good afternoon, Your Honor, and everyone else on the

1 call.

2           Today I'm just going to be going over how the Chicago  
3 Police Department handles officer-involved shootings. I kind  
4 of want to just give you a brief overview of what actually an  
5 officer-involved shooting is and what we consider one. How we  
6 investigated them prior to 2017, which was the creation of the  
7 Investigative Response Team, some of the issues we had with  
8 that. The turning point, which, again, was around the creation  
9 of IRT. Some of the reforms, improvements, and current  
10 practices we have implemented.

11           I'm going to talk about, briefly, our collaboration  
12 with COPA, the community and stakeholders like the IMT around  
13 the officer-involved shootings.

14           And then lastly, I'm just going to finish it with some  
15 of our guiding principles in IRT and within the Chicago Police  
16 Department, our future commitment to the community, and the  
17 culture we've now created around being transparent in  
18 investigating these officer-involved shootings.

19           So what is an officer -- you can go to the first  
20 slide -- back to the first slide, please.

21           So an officer-involved shooting, we treat it  
22 differently than all our other organizations in that it's any  
23 time we discharge a weapon towards an individual, even if  
24 there's hits or no hits. Some agencies treat it differently if  
25 there's hits or no hits. We are going to follow the practices,

1 the procedures, the policy that I'm going to talk about today  
2 any time one of our officers discharges a weapon.

3 We know that these incidents impact public safety,  
4 very important to officer accountability, and they can erode  
5 community trust if they're handled inappropriately. So Chicago  
6 Police Department is going to investigate the underlying  
7 criminal conduct, so that's the non-officer, that's the person  
8 more often than not that the officer's discharging their weapon  
9 towards. COPA is going to handle the administrative  
10 investigation into that officer, if they followed policy and  
11 procedure, and then both of our reports and both of -- all the  
12 facts that we gather between us and COPA are going to be  
13 presented to Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the law  
14 enforcement accountability division that's going to review all  
15 the facts and determine if the charges are appropriate against  
16 an officer who discharged their weapon.

17 Next slide, please.

18 Prior to the creation of IRT, and this is prior to the  
19 implementation of the Consent Decree, we started looking  
20 internally because we know we had some issues with how we  
21 handled officer-involved shootings. How it would happen prior  
22 to 2017 is if an officer-involved shooting happened in a  
23 specific area of the city, that detective area would be  
24 assigned. You kind of never knew which detective you were  
25 going to get, so you had varying degrees of skill level and

1 knowledge around these very critical incidents. We see  
2 inconsistent approaches and outcomes to these investigations.

3 We don't really have strong standardized duties,  
4 responsibilities, or procedures around officer-involved  
5 shootings. Our policies were kind of lacking and not specific  
6 to what we can and can't do if an officer discharges their  
7 weapon, or I should say what the officer can or can't do prior  
8 to them discharging their weapon.

9 We had some general cooperation with the Independent  
10 Police Review Authority. This is IPRA. They are the ones that  
11 predated or preceded COPA, but we honestly had limited  
12 coordination and transparency with them.

13 How it would be handled is very often right after the  
14 officer-involved shooting, almost hours after the  
15 officer-involved shooting, what happened, we would have a  
16 roundtable with IPRA, State's Attorney's Office, and members of  
17 the Chicago Police Department to go over the facts to kind of  
18 make that determination if it was a good or bad shooting, and  
19 this was done way too soon. All the facts were not gathered  
20 yet. We didn't have time to sit down and review everything.  
21 It was a bad procedure and it was a bad way of handling these  
22 officer-involved shootings, but that's something we realized  
23 and we changed going forward. So we knew that all these  
24 shortcomings led to efficiencies and eroded public trust  
25 because of the -- surrounding how we investigated these

1 officer-involved shootings.

2 Next slide, please.

3 So we knew it developed fractured trust with IPRA, the  
4 public. It contributed to the perceptions of unfairness in how  
5 we investigated these shootings. Again, CPD, and this is prior  
6 to us having the Consent Decree, actually looked inward, and we  
7 identified these systematic gaps in policy training and our  
8 culture. We listened to the community. We listened to  
9 stakeholders that demanded change. Throughout the years since  
10 2017, we've listened to those external stakeholders including  
11 the Consent Decree and the IMT and the OIG, and we've updated  
12 our policies surrounding how we investigate.

13 Next slide.

14 So in 2017, we created the Independent -- I'm sorry,  
15 the Investigative Response Team. They're going to handle all  
16 officer-involved shootings and officer-involved death incidents  
17 surrounding Chicago Police Department members. It's ran by  
18 one commander, one lieutenant, four sergeants,  
19 twenty-four detectives. This is a dedicated specific team that  
20 is on call 24 hours a day. So we know who we have, we know we  
21 have who we've identified investigate these, and it's going to  
22 be the same investigation coming out of this team every time.  
23 They're going to respond to officer-involved shootings,  
24 officer-involved deaths. They're also going to respond when an  
25 officer is shot and/or killed in the line or duty or in the

1 performance or the scope of their duty. Their job is to gather  
2 facts and prepare the criminal case against the non-offenders  
3 to the state's attorney's office.

4 IRT personnel are going to receive and they do receive  
5 ongoing training on best practices throughout the country  
6 surrounding officer-involved shootings.

7 Like the captain had discussed, we conduct pre-service  
8 training for all lieutenants. It's very dynamic,  
9 stress-induced officer-involved scenario. We also will teach  
10 all pre-service sergeants. That's usually a two- to four-hour  
11 block, dependent on how much time we have to fit in there,  
12 about the updates in policies surrounding officer-involved  
13 shootings and what they can and can't do in the  
14 responsibilities as a sergeant responding to these incidents.

15 Next slide.

16 Some of the changes that the department has made is  
17 the street deputy is the overall incident commander for these.  
18 He or she is there as the representative, as superintendent to  
19 ensure that all CPD members are following the policies and  
20 procedures we put in place. And very importantly, part of that  
21 is to ensure our cooperation with COPA.

22 We have updated our body-worn camera policy and the  
23 officers' requirements surrounding that. For example, officers  
24 cannot view their body-worn camera if they've discharged their  
25 weapon prior to providing a statement. And we've also

1 extended -- I know this was talked about before. I think Paul  
2 talked about this in his opening remarks about late activation.  
3 So, obviously, that needs to change, and we need to get our  
4 officers trained better on that. But to kind of cover that  
5 right now for a second, we have a 2-minute buffer period that  
6 used to be 30 seconds. So right now what happens is the  
7 body-worn cameras are always recording video, and when an  
8 officer activates it, it will then record video and audio.  
9 There's a two-minute buffer where it's always recording video  
10 so if something happens very quickly where the officer is  
11 unable to activate their camera during a critical incident like  
12 an officer-involved shooting, it's still going to hopefully  
13 capture that because we will have that ability to go back  
14 two minutes.

15           We have our forensics personnel photograph, video  
16 record, and now we 3D scan all of these crime scenes, which  
17 create very specific representations of the scene that could  
18 be, you know, measured down to the inches.

19           We require the separation of all our discharging and  
20 witness officers immediately after the incident, and we have  
21 sergeants sit with those officers to make sure they are not  
22 talking or colluding about what they saw or what they  
23 witnessed.

24           We also have our Bureau of Internal Affairs conduct  
25 drug and alcohol testing of all discharging officers after they

1 discharge their weapon.

2 Next slide.

3 COPA is allowed full access to the crime scene.

4 They're treated just like any other Chicago Police Department  
5 member. They're provided an on-scene briefing by both IRT and  
6 the street deputy. They're present for all first viewing of  
7 body-worn camera, in-car camera, any audio or video that's  
8 recovered from the scene. They're allowed preliminary  
9 assessments of the scene. We provide them with walk-throughs,  
10 briefings. They are present for all the recovery of any  
11 physical evidence as well. All physical digital evidence  
12 reports are turned over to COPA, and they are provided while  
13 still on scene, the witness contacts, and allowed to be present  
14 while we interview those witnesses well.

15 Next slide.

16 IRT puts an emphasis on recording all witness  
17 statements. This is something that was not done. Before, we  
18 usually would take notes on it, but now we try to do both. We  
19 will record them on body-worn camera to make sure that we're  
20 getting accurate statements of what that witness saw.

21 IRT, our area technology centers, and COPA will  
22 conduct joint canvasses for any video evidence, and all parties  
23 will be present while we're recovering that video evidence.

24 Same thing with our weapons downloads. So after an  
25 officer discharges their weapon, we will bring everyone into a



1 room and we will download that weapon and go round by round to  
2 do a count of the weapon and do an inspection of it. IPRA,  
3 COPA, the street deputy, forensics are all present during this.

4 And then to kind of separate the Chicago Police  
5 Department from some of the evidence, the evidence that's  
6 collected, any processing of it is sent to the Illinois State  
7 crime lab. Chicago Police Department crime lab, our forensics  
8 lab, will not do any testing of physical evidence related to an  
9 officer-involved shooting.

10 This was also talked about too. We will conduct a  
11 Force Review Board, the Chicago Police Department, within  
12 96 hours of an all officer-involved shooting. Present for  
13 that, IRT will present a briefing to CPD command staff, the  
14 superintendent and his Force Review Board, COPA is present,  
15 TRED, Independent Monitoring Team, and then TRED will actually  
16 be able to make recommendations on trainings, things that they  
17 saw went wrong, and they can actually point out things that  
18 went right during these officer-involved shootings.

19 All video, audio, and reports are released by COPA  
20 within 60 days. This is real big on the transparency of us  
21 releasing these reports and very important function of that.  
22 IRT provides all the reports to both COPA and the state's  
23 attorney's office for review.

24 Next slide.

25 So this is where we're at. We completely understand

1 our history and the importance to look internally at how we  
2 handle these officer-involved shootings. What I will say is  
3 though we've made extremely great strides at this, we are not  
4 stopping now. We're going to continue to look forward and  
5 continue to look for the best practices on how to handle these.  
6 We are emphasizing and creating a culture around information  
7 sharing and public release of these investigations because the  
8 public has great interest in how they're handled and the  
9 results of them.

10 We emphasize, you know, independent reviews by other  
11 entities and that joint process of working with COPA,  
12 Independent Monitoring Team, and other entities.

13 We've -- we really like the specialized training for  
14 our IRT members and how important it is to have a dedicated  
15 group that that's all they do, and they become the experts, the  
16 subject matter experts around this.

17 And then again, just going back to that prioritizing  
18 community trust and safety. This is very important to the  
19 public, and we recognize that, and we're going to strive every  
20 day to make sure that we conduct a thorough, professional  
21 investigation, and then that information is put out to the  
22 public so they have an understanding of what happened.

23 If there's no immediate questions, Judge, I will turn  
24 it over to Lieutenant Rhonda Anderson.

25 MR. SLAGEL: We're going to take a break here for the

1 AG's office.

2 Judge, do you have any questions for the commander?

3 Because unfortunately, he needs to leave to handle a matter.

4 THE COURT: I do not, but I very much appreciate this.

5 It was helpful to me. Thanks.

6 MR. KINNEY: Thanks, Judge.

7 MR. SLAGEL: I think according to the agenda, it's  
8 going to either Mike or Kate.

9 MR. TRESNOWSKI: Yes. Good afternoon.

10 THE COURT: Next items are from -- report from the  
11 Office of Attorney General regarding use or comments regarding  
12 use of force and also about officer-involved shootings.

13 So, Mr. Tresnowski, you're next.

14 MR. TRESNOWSKI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mike  
15 Tresnowski from the Office of Attorney General.

16 CPD's approach to Use of Force policy and Use of Force  
17 training has come a long way since the Office of Attorney  
18 General first filed this lawsuit in 2017.

19 As the Court is aware, when the Department of Justice  
20 released its report in 2017, it concluded CPD was engaging in a  
21 pattern and practice of an unconstitutional use of force. The  
22 DOJ specifically found CPD officers did not receive guidance  
23 regarding the appropriate use of force. Officers were not  
24 trained in how to reduce the need for force when interacting  
25 with community members. CPD failed to supervise officers' use

1 of force. DOJ found that the department was not identifying  
2 when officers were using dangerous tactics or behaviors, and in  
3 fact, at the time of the 2017 report, most officer use of force  
4 by CPD was not reviewed or investigated.

5 The DOJ found these failures in policy and training  
6 led to dangerous and unconstitutional police practices. The  
7 DOJ found that CPD officers were chasing and shooting fleeing  
8 persons who posed no immediate threat. The DOJ found that CPD  
9 officers were firing at vehicles. They were disregarding  
10 bystanders when discharging their weapons.

11 DOJ also found that CPD officers were frequently  
12 escalating confrontations. The department was also using less  
13 than lethal force such as Tasers on people who did not pose a  
14 threat. They were using less than lethal -- lethal force  
15 against children.

16 Now, as you just heard from CPD's presenters this  
17 afternoon, CPD's Use of Force policies and trainings look much  
18 different today. Before, officers were not given clear  
19 direction regarding when the use of force was reasonable and  
20 appropriate. They were not given skills-based training on how  
21 to de-escalate an incident. And now as you just heard, CPD  
22 officers receive an annual Use of Force class which covers  
23 topics such as de-escalation.

24 Earlier you heard that CPD develops these trainings  
25 through communication and collaboration with community members

1 as well as the IMT and the OAG.

2 Furthermore, you've heard that CPD has built an  
3 extensive review infrastructure in the form of the Tactical  
4 Review and Evaluation Division, or TRED, which allows for the  
5 systemic review of the use of force.

6 When an officer uses force or points a firearm or  
7 engages in a foot pursuit, CPD collects data about those  
8 incidents. The incidents are analyzed. Officers receive  
9 corrective feedback where necessary. This process was not  
10 occurring prior to the Consent Decree.

11 This long road that CPD has traveled brings us to a  
12 crucial point in the Consent Decree process. CPD has made  
13 progress in its trainings, it has made progress in its  
14 policies, and it has invested substantial resources in building  
15 a system for reviewing and analyzing force incidents.

16 But now all eyes turn towards the facts on the ground.  
17 The crucial question is have these policies, these trainings,  
18 these systems resulted in measurable change on the ground. Has  
19 CPD's sound policy improved its practices. This is a question  
20 that sits at the forefront of all the parties' minds.

21 The IMT has found that CPD is in secondary compliance  
22 with 93 percent of Use of Force paragraphs, as you heard  
23 earlier, but full compliance with 41 percent of those  
24 paragraphs. How does the department move from secondary  
25 compliance to full compliance. This requires an examination of

1 its practices on the ground.

2 As the Court knows, the coalition recently filed a  
3 notice of intent to enforce various Use of Force paragraphs,  
4 noting that CPD is using force more often against community  
5 members. The use of deadly force has increased from 2022 to  
6 2024, and CPD is pointing guns at community members more often.  
7 These are increases based on CPD's own data collection.

8 These are not the patterns and trends we would expect  
9 from a department that's approaching full compliance with the  
10 Use of Force section of the Consent Decree.

11 And let me just make this point with reference to a  
12 single issue. De-escalation techniques. As noted earlier, in  
13 2017, the Department of Justice found that CPD officers were  
14 often escalating incidents with community members. In 2017,  
15 the DOJ reports that officers were "unnecessarily escalating  
16 confrontations or using reckless, untrained tactics, putting  
17 themselves in a position of jeopardy, and limiting the force  
18 options to just deadly force."

19 Accordingly, the Consent Decree imposes an express  
20 de-escalation requirement. That's paragraph 161. It says both  
21 CPD officers must use de-escalation techniques or reduce the  
22 need for force whenever safe and feasible.

23 This de-escalation requirement is now a part of CPD  
24 policy. General Order G03-02 states in no uncertain terms  
25 department members are required to use de-escalation

1 techniques.

2 Same with training. CPD officers learn about  
3 de-escalation techniques in training. The principles of force  
4 mitigation are routinely provided to officers. Things such as  
5 continual communication, tactical positioning, the use of time  
6 as a tactic.

7 So these policy and training improvements have brought  
8 CPD from where it was in 2017 to secondary compliance with  
9 paragraph 161.

10 So what about on the ground. In the IMT's most  
11 recently community survey report which it filed with the Court  
12 in January 2025, it showed that positive sentiment regarding an  
13 officer's ability to de-escalate tense situations is trending  
14 downward, a 10 percent decrease in positive sentiment on this  
15 question from 2022 to 2024. And a department that is  
16 de-escalating tense situations effectively would not show the  
17 increases we're seeing in uses of force, in deadly force, and  
18 incidents where officers point weapons at people. The trends  
19 are not heading in the right direction.

20 So what is next. The parties must work on concrete  
21 ways of assessing CPD's on-the-ground practices to assess full  
22 compliance. The parties must identify concrete improvements  
23 that could be made where practices are not improving, and they  
24 must engage this process with a data-driven approach with input  
25 from community members.

1 All parties should be commended for the tremendous  
2 progress we've made thus far on the use of force. We've only  
3 gotten here through good faith collaboration from all parties.

4 From the OAG's perspective, the most crucial work of  
5 the Use of Force section, changing practices on the ground,  
6 lies ahead.

7 CPD also presented regarding its approach to  
8 officer-involved shootings, and I'd like to invite my colleague  
9 Kate Pannella to provide comments on that topic.

10 MS. PANNELLA: Thanks, Mike.

11 And thank you, Your Honor, for convening us today.

12 Katherine Pannella appearing on behalf of the State of  
13 Illinois.

14 The investigation of incidents in which a CPD officer  
15 has shot someone is one way in which CPD's actual practices on  
16 the ground have significantly improved and have improved before  
17 the completion of the CPD's written policy.

18 The Department of Justice investigation that concluded  
19 in 2017 found numerous deficiencies in police shooting  
20 investigations by both CPD and the Independent Police Review  
21 Authority, or IPRA, which is the civilian disciplinary body  
22 that predated COPA.

23 The Department of Justice noted in 2017 that although  
24 IPRA had jurisdiction to investigate CPD shootings of  
25 civilians, CPD controlled the flow of information to IPRA and



1 IPRA's access to evidence and witnesses in the crucial few  
2 hours immediately after a police shooting. IPRA investigators  
3 were not allowed onto the scene of a police shooting right away  
4 but had to wait outside the crime scene tape until after the  
5 CPD scene commander had concluded their preliminary  
6 investigation.

7 IPRA was not permitted to be present for the viewing  
8 of evidence or interviewing of witnesses on the scene during  
9 that time, and on-scene witness interviews were not recorded.

10 In addition, CPD officers who were present during a  
11 shooting were not prohibited from talking to each other about  
12 the shooting immediately after the incident before any  
13 investigation could occur.

14 The Department of Justice found that allowing involved  
15 officers to have private unrecorded conversations with  
16 supervisors, detectives, and union representatives before  
17 speaking with IPRA allowed for both inadvertent witness  
18 contamination and outright collusion typified by the cover-up  
19 of the Laquan McDonald murder.

20 As a result of these findings, paragraph 488 of the  
21 Consent Decree includes several specific requirements aimed at  
22 ensuring the integrity and transparency of the investigation of  
23 CPD shootings. COPA must be permitted access to the shooting  
24 scene in the immediate aftermath of the incident. COPA  
25 personnel must be present for CPD's first viewing of any video

1 or audio recording of the shooting. Involved and witness CPD  
2 officers must be separated at the scene and separately  
3 monitored to avoid communications about the shooting with  
4 anyone until released. And involved and witness CPD officers  
5 are prohibited from discussing the facts of the shooting with  
6 any other witness until after they have been interviewed by  
7 COPA. Many, if not all, of these requirements are now standard  
8 practice for CPD and COPA personnel. These are tremendously  
9 important reforms which OAG commends CPD and the City for  
10 implementing.

11           However, the City has made insufficient progress  
12 towards meeting another critical Consent Decree requirement  
13 found in paragraph 492. That paragraph requires the City to  
14 comply with an Illinois law known as the Police and Community  
15 Relations Improvement Act, or PCRIA for short. That law  
16 regards the investigation of any death involving an on-duty law  
17 enforcement officer and it requires that no investigator  
18 investigating such a death may be employed by the same law  
19 enforcement agency that employs the officer involved in the  
20 death. This statute became effective in 2016 in the wake of  
21 the Laquan McDonald cover-up, and its requirements are crucial  
22 to avoid any actual or perceived conflict of interest in the  
23 investigation of police-involved deaths.

24           The City of Chicago has taken what OAG views as small  
25 steps to identify an independent law enforcement agency to

1 investigate CPD officer-involved deaths. From OAG's  
2 perspective, this is a critically important issue that the City  
3 must prioritize.

4 And with that, I'll conclude my remarks.

5 Thank you, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Pannella.

7 Any questions for either Ms. Pannella or  
8 Mr. Tresnowski?

9 I think we should then -- I think what we have next is  
10 comments from the coalition on use of force.

11 MS. HICKEY: Thanks, Your Honor. I think that I'd  
12 call upon my colleague Bridget -- there's Wally. I see him.  
13 He's been promoted. He's now a panelist.

14 When you're ready, you can begin.

15 MR. HILKE: Good afternoon. Thank you to the Court  
16 for convening us today.

17 Wally Hilke on behalf of the Consent Decree Coalition.

18 I really just want to emphasize on behalf of the  
19 coalition a point that the Office of the Attorney General has  
20 already ably made, which I think can be summed up as when will  
21 the Chicago Police Department demonstrate urgency around the  
22 huge increases in use of force that its own data show over the  
23 past two years.

24 In public hearings throughout this year, the coalition  
25 has been raising the alarm, and although we've shared these

1 numbers before, I'm going to say them again to illustrate just  
2 how big the rises are.

3           Uses of force increased about 77 percent from 3,652  
4 uses of force to 6,470 uses of force between 2022 and 2024.  
5 Use of forces against children ages 15 years old and younger by  
6 Chicago Police Department officers doubled during that time.  
7 Gun-pointing incidents where Chicago police officers pointed  
8 guns at Chicago residents increased approximately -- by  
9 approximately 1,300 incidents from 2,925 incidents to 4,209  
10 incidents from 2022 to 2024.

11           Instead of hearing about that today, we have  
12 presentations on the training that the Chicago Police  
13 Department provided to prepare for the DNC in August of 2024.  
14 That is not the urgency that this problem demands. That is not  
15 the urgency that the community members, the survivors of police  
16 violence, and other Chicago residents are demanding from the  
17 Chicago Police Department. And when we presented these data in  
18 the past, what we heard from the Chicago Police Department was  
19 dismissive. It was questions about whether its own data were  
20 accurate. What we didn't see then and what we haven't seen  
21 today is a true accounting and accountability for these very  
22 large increases in use of force.

23           As the Attorney General's Office also mentioned, the  
24 coalition has served a letter of intent. We believe these  
25 large increases in the use of force show that the Chicago

1 Police Department is not complying with the Consent Decree, and  
2 the basic premise of our enforcement action is that the Chicago  
3 Police Department must achieve substantial reductions in the  
4 use of force against community members. That will not happen  
5 by accident. Instead, the Chicago Police Department must set  
6 concrete goals for making substantial reductions in the use of  
7 force, and we must work together to achieve them.

8 The good news, such as it is, is that the coalition  
9 believes everyone, the public, the Court, the monitoring team,  
10 the Attorney General's Office, and the Chicago Police  
11 Department, can acknowledge that use of force has risen, it has  
12 increased too much, and it can be brought back down, and we can  
13 work together to achieve that.

14 The next step is setting real goals to reduce that  
15 force and working together to achieve those goals. We hope  
16 that that will be the outcome of our negotiations with the  
17 City, and the coalition hopes that we will see substantial  
18 steps and substantial decreases in the use of force as a result  
19 of our collaborative work.

20 Thank you.

21 MR. SLAGEL: Your Honor, you're muted.

22 I think next we're supposed to hear --

23 THE COURT: Sorry. I'm sorry. I just was saying  
24 thank you, Mr. Hilke, and I think next we're going to hear from  
25 the Independent Monitoring Team as well on these -- I'm sorry.

1 I'm looking at the --

2 Mr. SLAGEL: I think we're next, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: Here's my list. I just turned it around.

4 Next from the City of Chicago on Crisis Intervention  
5 updates. Great. Thanks.

6 MS. ANDERSON: Good afternoon, Your Honor, and  
7 everybody on the call.

8 I'm Lieutenant Rhonda Anderson with the Crisis  
9 Intervention Unit. I'd like to begin by thanking Monitor  
10 Hickey for acknowledging the amount of progress we have made in  
11 this CIT section. It truly has been a multi-team collaborative  
12 effort.

13 Let's begin. So the CIT program is led by the Crisis  
14 Intervention Unit, and we fall under CPD's training and support  
15 group. The program supports safe and effective response by CPD  
16 officers to individuals who may be in behavioral or mental  
17 health crisis, and it also aims to proactively connect the  
18 community to resources to prevent the need for emergency  
19 response in the first place. The program aligns with  
20 CPD-required Consent Decree and data-driven performance goals.

21 Next slide, please.

22 What is CIT. CIT program is an internationally  
23 recognized best practice training that helps officers utilize  
24 de-escalation techniques, identify signs and symptoms of mental  
25 illness, and learn about more hyperlocal organizations and

1 service providers to connect individuals that may be  
2 experiencing mental health crises with these community  
3 resources. The program operates citywide 24/7, 365. There are  
4 certified officers assigned to every district on every watch.

5 Next slide, please.

6 So to become certified, officers voluntarily take the  
7 40-hour CIT basic course, and then they are subsequently  
8 required to attend a two-day refresher training every  
9 three years to maintain that certification status.

10 Now, to note, Field Training Officers, sergeants, and  
11 above are all required to take CIT training.

12 Once certified, these officers are then prioritized to  
13 respond to mental or behavioral health-related calls for  
14 service, and they're designated by an attribute code of Z next  
15 to their names for proper dispatch.

16 Certified officers must maintain an exceptional  
17 disciplinary record free of any sustained complaint of use of  
18 force or verbal abuse of an individual in crisis, and there are  
19 daily automated checks that validate the eligibility and  
20 training status of the officers.

21 As of November 8, 2025, CPD has 3,597 active certified  
22 CIT officers.

23 Next slide, please.

24 This is an overview of the unit as -- I currently  
25 serve as the CIT coordinator, and that's a lieutenant or above

1 who works to develop a uniform strategy for the department,  
2 working alongside other agencies. The administration section  
3 conducts the day-to-day operations and also includes our  
4 community outreach coordinator, who's a civilian, and our  
5 dedicated sergeant, who's responsible for Consent Decree  
6 compliance, Sergeant Sanchez.

7           Our area DOCS teams, which are District, Operation,  
8 and Community Support, are in all five areas, and these folks  
9 are the boots-on-the-ground officers and supervisors that are  
10 working hand in hand with community resources such as NAMI and  
11 Trilogy to reduce the frequency and severity of calls coming  
12 into 911. They review CIT-related reports and provide feedback  
13 to the officers that submitted them. They provide roll call  
14 trainings to officers, presentations to the community, and most  
15 important, working with these providers to conduct follow-ups  
16 with individuals and their families so they're aware of all of  
17 these great resources we have in the city.

18           The training section is responsible for delivering  
19 both those basic and refresher classes, and these are held  
20 year-round to meet the needs of acquiring new officers into the  
21 program and also maintaining currently certified officers'  
22 certifications.

23           We do expect to relaunch our advanced youth and  
24 veteran classes in the upcoming year. Those classes have not  
25 been delivered since 2009 and 2019, respectively. We all know



1 there's a big need for youth especially.

2 As of November 8th, the department's trained this year  
3 a total of 1,269 department members in 26 basic and  
4 28 refresher courses.

5 Next slide.

6 This is just a snapshot of the 911 call intake  
7 process. So a call will come into OEMC. The call taker will  
8 ask clarifying questions to determine the caller's needs, and  
9 calls that are identified as potentially having a mental health  
10 component are triaged accordingly. Call takers inquire about  
11 weapons, history of mental health conditions, violent  
12 tendencies. When they determine that a field response is  
13 appropriate, the CIT calls are then forwarded to the dispatcher  
14 who will prioritize a certified CIT officer to respond without  
15 compromising response parameters.

16 Next slide, please.

17 In 2024, there were 54,988 mental or behavioral health  
18 calls for services in the City of Chicago. Of these,  
19 approximately 45 percent were responded to by a certified CIT  
20 officer. CPD is aiming for over 50 percent of coverage on that  
21 with our secondary target of 75 percent to comply with the  
22 Consent Decree.

23 Listed below, these are the identified mental health  
24 crisis calls for service per OEMC. OEMC does additionally use  
25 their CIT triage questions, which are very detailed, to flag

1 any potential mental health-related 911 calls.

2 Next slide.

3 So as I mentioned the response ratios, the Consent  
4 Decree requires a preliminary goal of 50 percent response  
5 ratio. What that means is that half of all CIT-related calls  
6 for service will be responded to by a certified officer. The  
7 second benchmark is a 75 percent ratio, meaning three out of  
8 four calls will be responded to by a CIT officer.

9 And we have worked tirelessly with our data scientists  
10 to develop the best mathematically significant approach to  
11 address timely response as specified in paragraph 108. This  
12 effort is intended to bring paragraphs 107 through 112 into  
13 preliminary compliance, and the methodology is included in the  
14 certified CIT Officer Implementation Plan which will be  
15 released in the next year. And both descriptive and predicted  
16 analytics were utilized to model the staffing needs for every  
17 district in every watch.

18 Next slide, please.

19 Data and dashboards. We have some amazingly talented  
20 people in the strategics initiative division, and they have  
21 created some really stellar quarterly dashboards that help us  
22 to identify trends and also track progress such as the CIT  
23 event type, the call disposition, CIT report data. It also  
24 helps us in prioritizing which department members should be CIT  
25 trained and also helps us with the scheduling and attendance of

1 these classes.

2 The response ratios were able to use these dashboards  
3 to analyze each district and watch's respective response  
4 ratios, and we are currently working to identify elements of  
5 the internal dashboards that we can make accessible to the  
6 public in 2026.

7 Next slide.

8 We are very fortunate to be partnered with the Chicago  
9 Council on Mental Health Equity. They are a great asset and a  
10 recognized advisory committee for us. Alongside them, we  
11 review policies and trainings for alignment with any changing  
12 trends that officers are seeing out in the street and also that  
13 all those subject matter experts are seeing in their respective  
14 fields.

15 As of November 10th, we have conducted eight community  
16 engagements with them, and also what's been a big boon this  
17 year has been the department rollout of the digitized resource  
18 guide, so this is accessible by officers on all department  
19 phones as well as the portable data terminals that are in their  
20 cars, and that connects officers in the field to all types of  
21 referral services including behavioral and mental health  
22 services.

23 We are currently collaborating with the University of  
24 Chicago Survey Lab to distribute our CIT effectiveness surveys,  
25 and they will be going out to certified CIT officers,

1 identified coalition members, and the CCMHE.

2 Next slide, please.

3 Next steps. Everybody wants to hear about the City's  
4 Crisis Intervention Plan. So currently, OEMC and the City are  
5 working to complete their scope of work for the City plan to be  
6 submitted this reporting period. The plan will incorporate  
7 data related to calls for service and the type of CPD response;  
8 qualitative data on feedback from CIT training as well as  
9 feedback from the community and CPD officers on the  
10 effectiveness of the CIT program; recommendations from the  
11 CCMHE, of course; research on best practices for police  
12 response to persons in crisis as well as the identification of  
13 and dispatch of these calls. The OEMC section of the plan  
14 includes an audit as well as feedback from call takers and  
15 dispatchers on calls for service involving individuals in  
16 crisis.

17 Next slide, please.

18 Next steps for the Crisis Intervention Unit is  
19 submitting the CIT Certified Officer Implementation Plan. That  
20 also includes the data related to calls for service and the  
21 type of response; final staffing models and district deployment  
22 resources; predictive coverage analysis; timeliness, standards,  
23 and dispatch efficiency, taking into account both seasonality  
24 and proportionality; follow recruitment and retention  
25 strategies of the program; and then highlighting some of our

1 complementary programs such as naloxone and the Narcotics  
2 Arrest Diversion Program. These were developed collaboratively  
3 with our city partners and also OEMC, the strategics initiative  
4 division of CPD, who are the brains behind the statistics.  
5 Just to note, this plan and the City's Crisis Intervention Plan  
6 will not contain any personal identifying information.

7 Next slide.

8 Quick snapshot of the Consent Decree progress by our  
9 compliance levels as of June 30, 2025, and this period, the  
10 Crisis Intervention Unit is seeking to gain levels of  
11 compliance in multiple paragraphs, especially around that CIT  
12 Certified Officer Implementation Plan, paragraphs 107 through  
13 112. OEMC and the City are seeking to gain levels of  
14 compliance also in multiple paragraphs around 122 to 123 and  
15 148 to 149 with their scope of work for the City's Crisis  
16 Intervention Plan.

17 Next page.

18 So through strengthening data transparency and officer  
19 readiness, deepening our community partnerships and soliciting  
20 ongoing feedback and incorporating that feedback, aligning with  
21 Consent Decree requirements and national best practices,  
22 proactively working to divert eligible individuals and  
23 connecting others to community resources to prevent future  
24 contact with the criminal justice system, the Crisis  
25 Intervention Unit is working alongside city partners and the

1 community to build a sustainable system with a safe and  
2 dignified response to all persons in crisis.

3 Thank you for your time.

4 THE COURT: Thank you very much.

5 I think we are ready -- are we ready to turn once  
6 again to the OAG, correct?

7 MS. HICKEY: Yes, you're correct, Your Honor. You're  
8 correct.

9 THE COURT: So Ms. Grieb?

10 MS. GRIEB: Thank you, Your Honor.

11 Good afternoon, everyone.

12 Good afternoon, Your Honor.

13 My name is Mary Grieb and I represent the State of  
14 Illinois.

15 The parties and the monitoring team last provided  
16 updates on the Crisis Intervention section about a year and a  
17 half ago in April of 2024, and there's been concrete progress  
18 since then as we've heard, but some of the challenges  
19 identified by the parties and the coalition at that hearing  
20 remain.

21 First, I'd like to highlight the progress. In the  
22 last 18 months, the department has continued to offer training  
23 on appropriate responses to individuals in crisis and  
24 recognizing and responding to mental and behavioral health  
25 conditions. For example, the department developed training for

1 recruits. Those courses included the Neurobiology of Trauma,  
2 CIT Recruit Concepts, and Mental Health Awareness and Response.

3 This year, the department is providing a day-long  
4 training in crisis intervention and officer wellness to all of  
5 its officers.

6 The department also produced recently to the Attorney  
7 General's Office and monitoring team a framework for developing  
8 its Crisis Intervention Officer Implementation Plan, as we  
9 heard about, which is a requirement of paragraphs 108 through  
10 112 of the Consent Decree. While this framework is only an  
11 outline of what will need to be a much more comprehensive plan,  
12 it is a critical first step towards implementing a plan that  
13 ensures that every certified CIT officer is available on every  
14 watch in every district to respond to, at first, 50 percent of  
15 the calls for service involving individuals in crisis, and  
16 ultimately, 75 percent of those calls.

17 The City has also recently submitted to the monitoring  
18 team and the Attorney General's Office its own framework for  
19 its part of the Crisis Intervention Plan requirement of  
20 paragraphs 122 and 123.

21 CPD increased its compliance levels in 12 paragraphs  
22 in the last reporting period. One in particular that I'd like  
23 to highlight for the Court is paragraph 121. That paragraph  
24 requires that CPD assign a sufficient number of data analysts  
25 to collect and analyze data related to the CIT program and

1 CPD's response to incidents involving individuals in crisis.

2 CPD moved to secondary compliance with that paragraph  
3 because it now has three assigned data analysts to analyze the  
4 data that will be necessary to show what is working with the  
5 CIT program so far and what changes need to be made. This  
6 increased capability to collect and analyze data will allow the  
7 department and the city to make evidence-driven plans, and as  
8 the independent monitor noted in its most recent report, also  
9 consider factors such as uses of force, alternate response, and  
10 diversion from the criminal justice system for individuals in  
11 crisis.

12 Data collection and analysis is critical to further  
13 progress in the Consent Decree, and we are hopeful that the  
14 staffing development spurs even more progress by the Crisis  
15 Intervention Unit.

16 The Office of Emergency Management and Communication  
17 has also finalized training for its telecommunicators titled  
18 "Crisis Intervention and Mental Health Awareness." Our office  
19 is hopeful that this training will provide critical strategies  
20 for OEMC telecommunicators who are often the first contact for  
21 a person in crisis or their family seeking help.

22 This progress over the last year and a half truly is  
23 commendable, and OAG appreciates the hard work of the dedicated  
24 members of the Crisis Intervention Unit, the CIU, at CPD and  
25 the staff at OEMC to move these requirements forward.



1           Unfortunately, some challenges that the parties  
2 identified a year and a half ago remain. The CIU is  
3 understaffed. Despite efforts to recruit more department  
4 members to the unit, the CIU is still under-resourced. For  
5 example, the CIU had 56 personnel in 2021 but now only have  
6 about 40, far below the minimum of 60 that CPD's own needs  
7 assessment has recommended for this unit.

8           The short staffing, of course, has consequences. The  
9 CIU training division has not provided the advanced CIT youth  
10 training since 2019 or the advanced CIT veterans training since  
11 2009. We're happy to hear today that they plan to relaunch  
12 these courses next year.

13           The CIT Districts [sic], Operations, and Community  
14 Support area teams, referred to as CIT DOCS, and as  
15 Lieutenant Anderson said, the boots on the ground, our officers  
16 who go out in the field follow up with high-frequency users of  
17 police services and review CIT reports just as some examples of  
18 their work, but they're limited to only one team in each of the  
19 five areas of the city. Again, CPD's own needs assessment  
20 recommends at least 15 additional personnel to support the CIT  
21 DOCS work. While the Attorney General's Office recognizes that  
22 staffing can be a challenge department-wide, we urge the  
23 department to prioritize fully staffing the CIU unit.

24           Another challenge that remains from a year and a half  
25 ago is how far away CPD and the City are in developing the

1 Crisis Intervention Plans and collecting and analyzing robust  
2 data to inform these plans.

3           While the three data analysts I described earlier are  
4 very promising and the department's commitments and  
5 Lieutenant Anderson's presentation today are also very  
6 promising, the City and CPD must commit to a thorough,  
7 meaningful development, and eventually, implementation of these  
8 plans. Ensuring a timely, well trained, and appropriate  
9 response to individuals in crisis will not just reduce the need  
10 to use force or even arrests will also go a long way towards  
11 building trust with the community and reducing interactions  
12 between law enforcement and people in crisis.

13           Lastly and relatedly, we urge the department and the  
14 city to continue to increase its community engagement efforts  
15 and transparency including instituting a feedback loop with the  
16 Chicago Council on Mental Health Equity, which we just heard  
17 about from Lieutenant Anderson, and making data collection and  
18 analysis available to the public when that's appropriate. We  
19 are pleased to hear those commitments today.

20           While there has been great progress in policy  
21 development and training in this section, the department and  
22 the city must collect data on the ground to determine where  
23 there's the most need for CIT certified officers, how the  
24 department and the city's current CIT program is working, and  
25 what is necessary to fully implement the Crisis Intervention

1 Plan for the department and city as a whole, which we believe  
2 will help reduce use of force against individuals in crisis.

3 We appreciate the work that the CPD and City have done  
4 since the last status hearing about a year and a half ago, but  
5 we know there is much more work left to do to help our city's  
6 most vulnerable residents. Our office is committed to working  
7 with the city, the CPD, the Independent Monitoring Team, and  
8 the coalition to make further progress.

9 Thank you, Your Honor.

10 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Grieb.

11 Next on our agenda are further comments from the  
12 coalition, this time about crisis intervention, and I  
13 understand it's again Mr. Hilke who will be speaking to us?

14 MS. HICKEY: Yes, and we will be moving from the  
15 general audience into the panelist mode.

16 THE COURT: Okay. Great.

17 MR. HILKE: Good afternoon again. Wally Hilke again  
18 on half of the Consent Decree Coalition.

19 The coalition has expressed concerns many times in  
20 hearings before this Court about the too-slow pace of reform in  
21 the CIT section of the Consent Decree, and the consequences of  
22 that reform being too slow are felt in the real lives of people  
23 in crisis who are met with escalation and force in  
24 criminalization instead of the diversion and connection to  
25 community-based resources that the Consent Decree mandates.

1           At the last public hearing, the Court heard not just  
2 from the coalition, but from multiple community members and  
3 stakeholders about this issue, and some of the themes that  
4 community members who came before this Court to talk about what  
5 they wanted to see included that uses of force against people  
6 experiencing mental health crises were increasing; that there  
7 were fewer and fewer resources available for alternative  
8 responses to the police for people in crisis; that there were  
9 increases in forced hospitalizations with shocking racial  
10 disparities in the outcomes of those police encounters; that  
11 there's not enough coordination of resources in the city's  
12 alternative response network with CPD; and that -- and at root,  
13 the human cost in trauma that people in crisis feel when they  
14 are not treated with the respect and dignity that the Consent  
15 Decree demands.

16           The coalition has consistently advocated that the  
17 Consent Decree demands transparency in outcomes, especially  
18 outcomes in crisis response.

19           Something that is -- the coalition hopes to see is  
20 that the CIT Officer Implementation Plan is implemented soon  
21 and that the required annual crisis intervention plan is  
22 implemented soon as well. The coalition would like to see  
23 those implemented early in 2026.

24           But as with use of force, the coalition advocates that  
25 CIT be evaluated not just as a policy and training measure when

1 what really is at the root of CIT is diversion and  
2 de-escalation, and that means outcomes that people who are  
3 being responded to with CIT calls are diverted from the  
4 criminal legal system, that de-escalation is happening in those  
5 encounters. If those outcomes -- those outcomes should be  
6 front and center in every presentation that CPD makes about its  
7 CIT program, and if outcomes are not being improved and met,  
8 then the conversation should be what will be done that is new  
9 or different to help people in crisis to achieve the goals of  
10 the Consent Decree. That's what the Consent Decree requires,  
11 that's what we believe full compliance looks like, and we hope  
12 to see an increased emphasis on outcomes and improvement in  
13 those outcomes as a result of the CIT program.

14 Thank you.

15 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hilke.

16 I believe we have time to hear from the  
17 superintendent, and I know that he's been with us.

18 If you have a few minutes for us, Superintendent  
19 Snelling, I'd be happy to hear from you.

20 MR. SNELLING: Absolutely, Your Honor, and thank you  
21 and good afternoon.

22 And good afternoon to everyone on the call.

23 I'd just like to start off by thanking everybody for  
24 their comments. I just, you know, just want to talk about a  
25 few things that we went over. A lot of it had to do with the

1 training, a lot of updates that we've made, and there has been  
2 a lot of improvement by CPD and a lot of great work being done  
3 by our team and in conjunction with the IMT along with the  
4 OAG's office, but we're not spiking the football. We do know  
5 we've got a long way to go, but things are trending in the  
6 right direction.

7 I wish we could snap our fingers and just turn the  
8 department around 100 percent completely, but we all know it  
9 doesn't work that way. Change is slow, especially if it's  
10 going to be effective.

11 So the first thing I want to start out is, you know,  
12 we started out talking about 2007 as it related to force  
13 mitigation, force mitigation training, training around our new  
14 Use of Force policies and our new Use of Force model. We  
15 looked at what got us here. We looked at what got us to the  
16 Consent Decree, and this is where the changes were made, the  
17 problems that we solved, and you heard from the commander of  
18 IRT who talked about how we handle police-involved shootings  
19 now, especially after Laquan McDonald.

20 A lot of our training is infused with several things.  
21 It's infused with respectful encounters with people. It's also  
22 infused with CIT training, and that was part of the force  
23 mitigation training to recognize when someone was in crisis and  
24 take your time. Call for additional resources to get that job  
25 done.

1           Our changes in training helped officers because it  
2 clearly defined what the expectations were for the officers  
3 when it came to use -- to the use of force. Prior to this,  
4 there were no clear, clearly defined expectations around use of  
5 force or around how a police-involved shooting should be  
6 handled, so we know that there are guidelines in place now that  
7 people can be held accountable for. So it's not just about the  
8 changes in training, but it's also an accountability measure.  
9 So now that we know that we have things that are more clearly  
10 defined, we can look at things on a deeper level.

11           I'd like to address a few things raised by the Office  
12 of the Attorney General first, and one of the things that was  
13 brought up was an increase in use of force.

14           When we look at the numbers and the years that have  
15 been combined that we're comparing our recent years with,  
16 you're looking at two years of COVID, the year 2020, 2021 where  
17 we saw major decreases in police contact with people on the  
18 street. There was a major reduction in arrests. People were  
19 taken into custody where we weren't holding people, and so when  
20 we look at the increase now, everything has opened back up.  
21 Officers are out there a lot more.

22           One of the other things is something that was  
23 mentioned about uses of force as it relates to children, and I  
24 know I'm crossing over into the coalition right now, but one of  
25 the things that increased since that time were street takeovers

1 and the number of teen takeovers. Our officers have been  
2 dispatched to hundreds of those calls where we have teen  
3 takeovers in the downtown area, at the beaches, and in our  
4 local neighborhoods. Fights break out. You have teenagers  
5 running through the streets. They're --

6 I'm sorry. Can you hear me? Hello? Can you hear me?

7 THE COURT: Yes.

8 MR. SNELLING: So there are times when our officers  
9 have to put hands on these young people, take them into  
10 custody, break up fights. Any time that happens now because of  
11 a component that was never a reportable use of force prior to  
12 2021 now is. So any time you put hands on someone and they  
13 pull away, that is a Tactical Response Report that has to be  
14 completed. So any time an officer's breaking up a fight, they  
15 grab a young person or they take a young person into custody,  
16 even if there's no use of force that rises above basic control,  
17 a Tactical Response Report still has to be completed. That  
18 accounts for some of the rise in those reports.

19 Also, there used to be two separate things when it  
20 came to an officer filling out a Tactical Response Report and  
21 an Officer Battery Report, an OBR. The OBR was solely for the  
22 officer to document when an officer had become a victim of a  
23 battery himself/herself. Now it's all a Tactical Response  
24 Report. So even if an officer doesn't use force, the officer  
25 still has to complete a Tactical Response Report.



1           So if we're solely looking at the rise in numbers of  
2 Tactical Response Reports that are completed, that does not  
3 tell the whole story in the use of force that officers are  
4 engaging in, in the field.

5           The other thing is, is that we know now our officers  
6 are now completing Tactical Response Reports because it is  
7 clearly defined that they will be held accountable if they're  
8 not completing these Tactical Response Reports.

9           The other thing is we also see with our watch  
10 commanders, our sergeants, and our officers that when in doubt,  
11 complete the Tactical Response Report. This helps us with  
12 transparency, which is why we have a dashboard that displays  
13 this. It also helps us and TRED identify possible patterns of  
14 practice or when something has gone wrong that we could take  
15 corrective action on.

16           Pointing incidents. So there is an increase in our  
17 pointing incidents, right, and we're the first to say that,  
18 which is why now we have our captains in the district involved  
19 in this so that this doesn't get to TRED and there's a  
20 prolonged amount of time before these things are reviewed. Our  
21 captains in the district are reviewing every single pointing  
22 incident as it occurs. This way now, this raises the  
23 accountability factor.

24           Now, one thing we do know is that in 60 to 65 percent  
25 of these incidents where there's a pointing issue, there have

1    been arrests made in those situations. Now, that doesn't mean  
2    that we believe that every pointing incident is or should be  
3    justified. This is why we have our captains taking a look at  
4    this so that we can take a deeper dive to make sure that this  
5    isn't being done excessively, so that work is ongoing and it is  
6    being done.

7           When we talk about CIT, again, in all of our force  
8    mitigation training, there is a component, a recognition of  
9    someone who has suffered from a mental health crisis so that  
10   our officers do not rush into those situations. And if an  
11   officer is armed with that information, they take their time  
12   moving in, especially if it's -- if it doesn't cause a call for  
13   an immediate response physically to stop someone from being  
14   hurt or injured.

15           Obviously, there's work to be done when it comes to  
16   hiring people to fully man CIU. As you know, we've had our  
17   struggles with getting the resources and getting the people in,  
18   but we are still working on that, so we are dedicated to  
19   getting that done.

20           There was another thing mentioned about getting people  
21   to hospitals, forced hospitalization by the Chicago Police  
22   Department. The issue here is the Chicago Police Department  
23   does not have other resources for people who are suffering from  
24   mental health crisis. It would be greatly appreciated if we  
25   got all parties involved when it comes to that. These

1 resources have to be provided not just by the Chicago Police  
2 Department, by everyone who's involved. We have limited  
3 resources, so we do what we can to try to make a situation as  
4 safe as possible, so we work with what we have. Would we like  
5 to do something better? Yes, but if we had access to those  
6 resources, we would do that.

7 PCRIA. PCRIA is a very serious situation to us, but  
8 as you know, and we talked about this, Your Honor, that it's  
9 not just the Chicago Police Department. We have to get  
10 everyone involved, and I actually look forward to the Office of  
11 the Attorney General in identifying another law enforcement  
12 agency who would be willing to step in and work with the  
13 Chicago Police Department. That's a struggle, and it's not  
14 just the Chicago Police Department. As you know, there are a  
15 lot of moving parts here when it comes to PCRIA, and we need to  
16 get everyone involved.

17 We've made our attempts to get some things done. That  
18 doesn't mean that we can't continue to work toward this, but in  
19 the meantime, because we don't have a PCRIA agreement right  
20 now, our IRT team is as transparent as we can possibly be.

21 You've heard earlier, and I understand these concerns,  
22 but you also heard earlier from the Office of the Attorney  
23 General is that our IRT team works closely with COPA, allowing  
24 them on the scene. Any evidence that's recovered, there are  
25 other entities who are there who get to witness these things,

1 and everything is an open book.

2 We are not -- and we do the best that we can because  
3 we know that we are investigating our own. We do the best that  
4 we can to make sure that our officers are separated so there's  
5 no collusion. No one is working to come up with a story. COPA  
6 is there, available when we download and watch the videos, and  
7 we watch them together, when the officer is downloading the  
8 weapon and we're counting the number of rounds in the gun to  
9 make sure that everything is documented accurately.

10 So that's where we are right now until we can come up  
11 with some agreement on PCRIA, but we can't not work on doing  
12 the best we can to come up with the best possible  
13 investigations.

14 Look, the key is when we look at what happened during  
15 the Laquan McDonald shooting compared to now, I mean, we have  
16 made major, major progress in transparency, effectiveness in,  
17 you know, investigating police-involved shootings, and to make  
18 sure that the public understands that we are taking it  
19 seriously, that the public trusts the investigation that we're  
20 doing when it comes to police-involved shootings.

21 I mean, I know that's a lot right now, and there's a  
22 lot more I could talk about, but I don't want to prolong this  
23 much longer, but I would like to thank everyone on the call  
24 because there's been a lot of great work being done. I can  
25 really appreciate these conversations and the information not

1 only coming from the IMT, the OAG, but also the coalition  
2 because this keeps us on our toes and it keeps us focused on  
3 what we need to work on and the direction that we need to keep  
4 moving in.

5 I'm proud to say that the Chicago Police Department is  
6 moving in the right direction, but I'm also -- I'm also under  
7 the complete understanding that we still have a lot of work to  
8 do and a long way to go, and I appreciate everyone on the call  
9 and all the work that's being done around us.

10 So thank you, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Well, I thank you, Superintendent  
12 Snelling. I think all of us recognize that there's a lot of  
13 work to be done and that we can certainly recognize progress,  
14 and we also recognize that there's -- the path is -- the road  
15 is long ahead of us.

16 But it would never happen without -- this reform would  
17 not happen without the commitment of the superintendent, and  
18 you've demonstrated over and over that you are not resistant,  
19 and in fact, very much on the team with respect to trying to  
20 get things right, and I'm just always conscious of that,  
21 recognizing that, you know, we can't be -- we can't, as you  
22 point out, rest on our laurels here, but we certainly know that  
23 this group, everybody here wants to see things improve and  
24 we're all pulling in the same direction on that, so I want to  
25 thank you.

1 Further comments from the OAG this afternoon.

2 Ms. Grieb?

3 MS. GRIEB: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

4 Just very briefly, we appreciate the Court and the  
5 monitoring team convening the parties and the coalition today  
6 to provide these updates to the public. I think we've really  
7 heard a range of topics this afternoon and some real progress  
8 that has been made in the last ten years or so, but, of course,  
9 there remains, as I think we all agree, a lot more work to be  
10 done. We appreciate the commitment from the city and the  
11 department and, of course, Superintendent Snelling to continue  
12 to do this work.

13 Thank you, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: Thank you.

15 From the IMT, the team of monitors?

16 MS. HICKEY: Yes, Your Honor. I have just some brief  
17 remarks so that we can finish almost exactly on time.

18 I want to thank everyone today for their thoughtful  
19 comments.

20 I've served as the independent monitor assessing the  
21 City and CPD's compliance with reforms required by the Consent  
22 Decree for six years and nine months, and in that time, my team  
23 and I have worked hard to fairly assess the City and the CPD's  
24 work towards reform and candidly point out when they are not  
25 achieving the reform required when additional efforts or

1 different approaches are necessary. We will continue to  
2 provide transparent updates to the Court, the public, and the  
3 parties until the City has fulfilled its obligations under the  
4 Consent Decree.

5 Thank everyone for their time and attention today.

6 THE COURT: I will see you again in a month or so, and  
7 I thank you, and we'll press on.

8 MS. HICKEY: Thank you, everyone.

9 (Concluded at 2:57 p.m.)

10 \* \* \* \* \*

11 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript,  
12 to the extent possible, of the record of proceedings in the  
13 above-entitled matter given the limitations of conducting  
14 proceedings via video.

15  
16 /s/ VICKI L. D'ANTONIO  
17 VICKI L. D'ANTONIO, CSR, RPR, FCRR  
Official Court Reporter

January 15, 2026